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ABSTRACT
The Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) changed roles from a peaceful
political organization to an underground militant one in late April of 1955. This study
examines the reasons for which this revolution occurred, attempting to find modern parallels,
with the goal of discerning the possibility of a future revolution in Cameroon. Extensive
primary sources from the period were consulted, in addition to interviews with historians and
sociologists for historical background, while periodicals, official studies, political scientists
and economists were consulted for contemporary issues. Several individuals who were alive
during the Maquis period were also interviewed. The study found that while there are striking
similarities between the present and the past, the causal conditions of the Maquis were
initially nationalistic and philosophical, while revolutions in contemporary Cameroon would
most likely be born from socio-economic frustration. Project limitations were time, travel
limitations, and the population of sampling. Future studies in Douala, Mungo, and Sanaga
Maritime are suggested.
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INTRODUCTION
When peaceful revolution becomes impossible, violent revolution becomes
inevitable.
-John F. Kennedy

Revolution is never a boring subject. It has led to the birth of many nations as they
exist today, and the death of some of the greatest leaders and tyrants in history. It continues to
shape the world today, for better or for worse.

In Walter Lefeber’s work, Inevitable

Revolutions 1 , the author uses the above quote as a paradigm for understanding the United
States’ involvement in Central America, and how the lack of peaceful alternatives in these
countries often led to violent manifestations and civil war. Fraudulent elections, economic
malaise, societal oppression and the failure of democratic institutions all seem to lead to a
historical inevitability, both understandable and predictable.
And yet, revolution is often treated solely as a thing of the history books. All
revolutions seem inevitable, because the author already knows that they will occur. For the
people who live them, however, the possibility of a future revolution is something yet more
difficult to predict, although infinitely more useful.
The events leading to banning of the UPC party in Cameroon, a previously non-violent
political entity, were undoubtedly the most salient causes of the period of violent revolution
that followed. These manifestations, collectively known as the Maquis, began in Douala and
ravaged their way through the Cameroonian countryside, leaving many injured, without
homes, or dead. Although the political climate of colonial Cameroon was the primary cause of
this revolution, the severity of response cannot be solely attributed to the dissolution of one
political party. The conditions motivating this response were unquestionably more intricate,
facilitated by the social and economic realities of the period.
1
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When studying this period, I could not help but notice many parallels with modern-day
Cameroon. During the period directly preceding the Maquis, there were fraudulent elections,
economic difficulties that resulted in, among other things, great unemployment, and
manifestations of frustration in the form of strikes and demonstrations. One need not look far
to see corresponding conditions today. Through my research, I wanted to understand the roles
these conditions played in instigating the Maquis, and in so doing, understand if the
conditions today are benignly similar, or if they are portents for a revolution to come.
Previous Research
Previous ISPs – To my knowledge there have been four Independent Study Projects
concerning the Maquis prior to my own. The first project was completed in the fall of 1998
by Elizabeth McMahon and was entitled, “Maquis Motivations in the Dschang Subdivision” 2 .
The project considered the motivations of members of the Maquis from the Bamileke region
of Cameroon, as well as the personal experiences of people affected by the events,
particularly those from the Fonakeukeu Chefferie.

The project also included relevant

background information on the Bamileke Maquisards, and concluded that “though the Maquis
was a movement born out of the UPC Party, it evolved independently” 3 .
The second project, “Mystery in Memories…” 4 by Harmony O’Rourke (Fall 1999),
dealt specifically with the Tombel Massacre of 1966, a conflict between Bakossi and
Bamileke peoples. The project focused on personal accounts of the event, and attempted to
piece together a coherent history of the event from both Bakossi and Bamileke accounts. The
project encountered many contradictions between these accounts, but nevertheless provided
vivid descriptions of the event.
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“The Maquis Rebellion..” 5 was a project completed in the fall of 2000, by Anne
Detwiler, and takes a broad look at the twenty-year period encompassing the formation of the
UPC, and the Maquis. The project was heavily centered around personal accounts, but with
the goal of understanding the entire period, rather than a specific event.
The most recent work specifically on the Maquis period was completed by Mary
Graham in the fall of 2003 and is entitled “Living History…” 6 The project deals specifically
with a group of Bamileke men who fought against the Maquis called “The Civic Guard.”
Much like O’Rourke’s work, the project focuses on the personal accounts of those involved,
and tries to capture the sense of fear and confusion that accompanied these events.
Along with these four projects, I found two other projects helpful to my research, both
completed in the fall of 2005. The first, “Remember Ruben?…”7 by Katelyn Knox, explored
the current perceptions of important figures (notably Ruben Um Nyobe) as nationalists, and
provided helpful background information on these figures. The other project, “Being
Anglophone…” 8 by Maggie Fick, (a fellow Pomona student) dealt specifically with the
Anglophone issue in Cameroon, particularly in Bamenda, but provided me with helpful recent
documents regarding election results and other current issues relating to Cameroonian
political dissatisfaction.
In addition to the information provided here concerning previous ISPs, I have attached
a list of sources that have been used in the aforementioned projects, along with some of my
own recommendations (See Appendix E). I was not able to use all of these sources (as is
evident in the bibliography). My hope is that students who do research in the future on the
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subject of the Maquis will be able to use this list of sources as a diving board, as one of my
greatest difficulties with the project initially was knowing where to begin.
Other Research – Richard Joseph’s work, Le movement nationaliste au Cameroun 9
was of great use to me, and provides extensive information on “the historical, socioeconomic, and political factors which contributed to the emergence of a violent confrontation
in Cameroon between the government and the nationalist party” 10 . Gregoire Momo’s
Terrorism en pays Bamileke... 11 is less exhaustive, but provides pertinent information on
Bamileke struggles, particularly involving the chefferie system in the Bamileke region of
Cameroon. Achille Mbembe’s The Maquis Rebellion 1920-1960 12 , was also an extensive
account of decolonization, but more specifically on the intellectual foundations of the Maquis,
and his introduction to Ruben Um Nyobe’s Ecrits sous les Maquis 13 was also very helpful in
understanding UPC objectives during the Maquis period. Jean-Claude Tchouankap is in the
process of defending a doctoral thesis on the formation of Cameroon and the UPC, but it has
yet to be published at the time of writing.
Research Objectives
In contrast to previous research, my project does not seek to narrate personal
experiences with the Maquis, nor does it seek to better clarify events that occurred in the past.
The project is intended to use the events of the past as a template for the future, and ask the
question: could something like this happen again? My goal is not to better understand the
events themselves, but rather to understand what historical, political, and social conditions
were paramount in creating them.

9
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I knew that with my time constraints, I would only be able to study a limited period of
Cameroonian history with any kind of depth. For this reason, I chose the period following
World War II and ending with the events of April 22, 1955, which marked the beginning of
the Maquis movement. In a similar vein, the contemporary issues I studied were likewise
limited. As a result, I focused on issues of democracy and human rights, socio-economic
conditions, and recent manifestations in the form of strikes and demonstrations.
Location of Study
Dschang – The decision to stay at Dschang was ultimately the result of two factors;
access to resources and familiarity. In addition to the resources available to me through the
SIT office, I also had the benefit of many University professors from the University of
Dschang. Also, contacts I had made during the pre-ISP period of the program regarding the
project were a major factor. Finally, the familiarity of informants with SIT students and my
own familiarity with the area helped facilitate my interactions, and were strong factors in my
decision to stay in Dschang.
Having said that, I still encountered many difficulties that resulted specifically from
this decision. While the Maquis began in 1955 and quickly spread from Douala north to the
West Province, the period in which they were most intense in Bamileke territory (like
Dschang and its periphery) was well after the rebellion had begun (between 1958 and 1962).
As a result, the information I received from personal accounts concerning this period was
fascinating, but not very pertinent to my research. For an ISP that explores this very subject, I
suggest Elizabeth McMahon’s project, “Maquis motivations in the Dschang subdivision” 14 .
Definition of Terms
Although most of my terminology should be accessible to a general audience, I realize
there are some terms that may be unclear.

14
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Revolution – “a forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favor of a new
system” 15 . Unless otherwise qualified, “revolution” in this paper refers to specifically
violent revolution.
Maquis – A term given by the French to the violent nationalist movement beginning in 1955.
The world literally refers to the dense, bushy forest, in which the Maquisards would hide.
Maquis movement and Maquis period will be used interchangeably with Maquis.
Maquisards – The revolutionaries who performed the Maquis. “Maquis members” will also
be used to refer to the Maquisards
Chefferie system – a traditional system of governance particularly strong in the Bamileke
region of Cameroon. The head of a chefferie may be called a chef, a fon, or a sultan.

METHODOLOGY
Limitations
Transportation – Transportation was a major issue during my stay at Dschang.
Although moto-taxis are nearly ubiquitous, the School of International Training forbids their
use due to issues of safety and liability. As a result, it was not uncommon for me, in a day, to
walk for more than 4 hours in order to meet my various appointments and access information.
My home-stay house alone was an hour away from the SIT office (and the town), meaning a
minimum 2-hour walk each day.
Power Outages – Power outages also provided a major obstacle to my research. In
Dschang, power outages are very common, and difficult to ignore after sunset. In addition to
delays encountered while trying to type the report on a computer, power outages often made
work impossible after 6:00 p.m. Every night of my stay in Dschang there was a power
outage, lasting from as short as a few seconds, to as long as 4 hours or more.

15
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Personal Health – For the third time during my time in Dschang, I became ill and had
trouble working for about five days of the research period. I was able to make up the
interviews I had missed, but for a project that only lasts 25 days total, I consider this a
significant limitation.
Language – In addition to the physical aspects of working in Dschang, communication
was sometimes inhabited by my ability to speak and understand French. Although these skills
have progressed significantly over the course of the program, complicated questions, or
questions requiring subtlety and finesse were extremely difficult for me to express, and
sometimes left my subjects baffled. My ability to read French is also inhibited by my 2 years
of experience, and so reading historical documents and literature in French often required
much time, patience, and thumbing through my French-English Dictionary.
Area/Population of Sampling – While Dschang provided me with considerable access
to resources and a rich intellectual community, my pool of subjects all live in the West
province and the vast majority are middle-aged males. As a result, there are regional and
gender-biases to my paper. In addition, the majority of my informants were PhD’s, many of
whom had previous experience working with American college students. This gives my
paper an intellectual bias as well, but I must acknowledge that this is, to some extent,
unavoidable.
Cameroonian’s perception of me – In addition to my choice of informants, my
personal identity undoubtedly affected my research as well. As a white, American male,
some Cameroonians were very willing to help me, while others (most notably the
Maquisards, themselves, whose rebellion was initially against white Frenchmen) were less
willing to aid my research, or had difficulty trusting me with sensitive information. This bias
was completely unavoidable, but hopefully moderated to an extent by cultural sensitivity and
my connections with Cameroonians.

Data Collecting Techniques
The vast majority of my data came from four categories of sources – personal
interviews, historical texts, periodicals, and official studies carried out by various reputable
institutions.
Interviews – With the exception of my interviews with people who had lived through
the period of the Maquis, I had no set of questions to ask each informant. Depending on their
specialty, I would ask different questions, and usually allowed the informant to explore ideas
as long as they didn’t diverge too far from my research project. I taped the vast majority of
my interviews, and revisited each taped interview in order to check the accuracy of my notes,
and to write down relevant quotes and information that I may have missed during.
Information from interviews was used both for the historical and for the contemporary
sections of the paper.
Historical Documents – Much of my more specific historical information came from
primary and secondary sources from the period. I did not use what I would consider history
textbooks, as I believed their information to be incredibly filtered, and not worth reading other
than for general background information on the period.
Journals and Periodicals – In addition to interviews, my knowledge of current events,
particularly those listed under the “manifestations” section of the results, was derived from
periodicals from the Post (Buea), the Cameroon Tribune (Yaounde), and BBC News
(England). I generally consulted multiple articles on each topic, with the hope of eliminating
some of the political bias of each newspaper.
Observations – The final source of information provided me much more with
anecdotal information than what I would call “scholarly” information. Living in Dschang, the
role of the informal sector and the effects of unemployment are inescapable. While there are

no significant portions of this report based solely on my observations, I will nevertheless
admit their personal effect on the writing of this paper.
Project Evolution
Although I was able to determine rather early in the program that I wanted to do a
project on the Maquis and revolution, the focus of the project has changed significantly.
Originally, I had the intention of investigating a UPC incident in the West Province (in
Dschang, or in Bafoussam) and comparing the conditions that produced that incident with
modern day Cameroon. However, after becoming more familiar with the history of the
Maquis, I realized that the most intense Maquis activity in the West province was between
1958 and 1962, well after the revolution had already begun. Because I wanted to parallel
modern conditions with the past, studying a period in which the revolution had already begun
would not provide me with an appropriate comparison. To draw any parallels, I would have
to look at the conditions directly prior to the commencement of the Maquis period, and
compare those conditions and causes to contemporary Cameroon.

RESULTS
“To aspire to last, and above all, to attain a legitimacy which limits the
systematic recourse to violence […] the power of the state must make
itself capable of integrating its approaches to serious proceedings […] by
which groups and communities reinvent themselves, without losing their
identities in the course of history” 16 .
Revolutions do not occur without cause. They are often a response by a frustrated
population to economic difficulty or social oppression. Although some of these difficulties
are historically inevitable, the quality of democratic institutions to address the concerns of
their people is a major factor in determining whether these frustrations manifest themselves
in cooperative solutions or violent demonstrations.
16
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But simply having democratic institutions does not guarantee their legitimacy.
Supposedly democratic societies can be, in reality, plutocratic, leading to government by a
distinct and disinterested elite 17 . The interests of the masses, without a peaceful means of
expression, will manifest in destructive behavior. In the words of Dr. Mathias Atsatito, a
sociologist with the University of Dschang, “In a society that is closed, in a society that is not
democratic […] when people are poorly treated and don’t have a means to change things other
than by a movement of mass […] the movement is more numerous than in an open society” 18 .
If institutions repress the possibility of democratic change, violent change is often the only
remaining recourse.

Yesterday’s Revolution
In order to understand the events leading to the naissance of the Maquis movement in
1955, one has to consider the social and political difficulties created by colonization. The
effects of European colonization had touched “not only [...] the physical space in which the
native had evolved [...] (but) all the way to the very foundations of his imagination” 19 . Under
the French system of the indigénat, Cameroonians were subject to forced labor on Europeanowned plantations. Due to the repulsive working conditions on white plantations, the French
had discovered “that the only manner to perpetuate the white colonization in Cameroon would
be to resort to forced labor” 20 . While this system was banned shortly after the end of World
War II, “the after-war reforms (abolition of the indegénat, union liberalization, formation of
political parties) were, in effect, to accentuate the divide (between Europeans and
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Cameroonians) and to crystallize the excited conflicts, for the most part, between the two
wars” 21 .
The Birth of Nationalism and the UPC
Cameroonians had served in the French army during the Second World War, and “this
participation of Africans and Asians in the War contributed to the birth of Nationalism after
the war” 22 . The idea of fighting for personal rights and liberties that had motivated allied
efforts against the fascist regimes could equally be applied to oppressive colonial regimes.
Returning soldiers, “when they were in France during the War, fought for the liberty of
people. When they returned, they found that the condition of their own people was the same
(as it had been)” 23 . In addition to the surrender of the French forces to Germany after less than
one year of combat, returning soldiers had witnessed and participated the killing of
Europeans. The reality of France’s vulnerability helped dispel illusions concerning the
invincibility of their colonizers, and opened the door to new forms of resistance and
confrontation.
This phenomenon was not limited to Cameroon; the war helped spur the nationalist
movement all over the world. The strength of nationalism was that “it was an ideology
capable of uniting an oppressed people, of drawing them together in an opposition to their
common enemy, the imperialist oppressor” 24 . Parties such as the RDA (Rassemblement
Démocratique Africain) united the continent in the goals of independence and democracy.
Born from this organization was the United Peoples of Cameroon party, or UPC. Although
there had existed nationalist movements before the UPC in Cameroon, “what distinguished
(the UPC) from its precursors of the proto-nationalist time is the fact that it transcended the
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horizon of local politics” 25 . In the party, “all the Cameroonian social classes were represented,
[...] politicians, businessmen, government workers, peasants and manual workers, and
‘intellectuals’ of all levels” 26 . By appealing to the philosophical ideals of human liberty and
independence, “the UPC was attacking the intellectual postulates upon which the colonial
project had founded its legitimacy and had obtained the submission of the natives” 27 .
The State of Democracy
In addition to new political parties, new power structures were emerging in Cameroon.
“There was a kind of generational conflict, a social revolution which was put in place by the
colonial administration which had reversed the habitual aristocracy” 28 . These new avenues of
power – money, education, and foreign government, created a new class ready to embrace
self-rule and democracy. Nevertheless discriminatory legislation that favored colonizers and
the colonial structure systematically excluded Cameroonians from self-government, and
limited their opportunities for advancement (See Appendix B).
In response to this new generation, the French created elections to choose the deputies
for the French Constituent Assembly in 1945 29 . Despite the semblance of democracy
represented by the elections, “it was impossible for a candidate of the UPC to win, in reality,
in an election during the colonial period after the war, for the simple reason that the French
would not tolerate it” 30 . The only Cameroonians elected “represented regions, often tribes or
races, but there were not representatives of parties” 31 .
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In 1951, Ruben Um Nyobe, the secretary general of UPC, ran for a position in this
assembly. Despite his position and his party’s popularity among diverse Cameroonian peoples
(particularly strong in Douala, where he campaigned), Um was denied his position.
The Colonial Economy
In addition to the political difficulties of the period, Cameroonians also faced
economic hardship. Under the colonial regime “all the agriculture was destined and produced
for exportation [...]. farmers were nearly obligated to produce export or ‘cash crops’ like
coffee, cocoa, and bananas” 32 . Under the guise of developing Cameroon, “an important accent
was placed on the extension, the commercialization (of the export industry),” but in
Cameroon as a whole “there was not a transformation” 33 . Cameroon remained “an agrarian
society with the rural people subordinated by requisitions, taxes, and diverse chores” 34 .
This export economy was dependent upon rural production, and was greatly affected
during the first five months of 1955, when “an economic malaise installed itself in all of
Southern Cameroon” 35 . Particularly affected were those in Douala, as problems in Douala
were, “therefore, in part, issued from the rural malaise transferred to the city” 36 . Heavily
impacted by unemployment, “there was the development of an under-proletariat, essentially
composed of immigrants who, without power to find work in the city, continued nevertheless
to reside there.” This “under-proletariat” would play an important role in the coming months
as tensions with the French government began to rise 37 .
Struggles resulting from this export economy were not isolated to the urban Bassa
territories in littoral Cameroon, however. In the Bamileke region of the country, struggles
with traditional and colonial power structures likewise bred conflict. “There was, between the
32
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leaders – the chefs and his notables, a fracture between these leaders and the population” 38 , in
the sense that “Chefs [...] and the government workers constituted a caste”39 . This relationship
was necessary to ensure colonial dominance, and exploited the existing structure of chefferies
in the West of Cameroon, as well as the lamibés in the North 40 .
Political Factors
According to the rules of the chefferie system, the chef had the right to distribute land–
not for personal reasons, but so that the members of community could live on the land 41 .
However, many chefs “transformed the rules of normal (community) functioning to their
selfish advantage” and “profited from their position by separating the land. [...] Like personal
property, [...] they took community land to have their own coffee plantations” 42 . It must be
noted, however, that not all chefs participated in such exploitation. “There were also some
chefs who [...] officially affirmed their opposition to the colonial power”43 . As a result of their
resistance, these chefs were exiled, banned from their property, or killed.
The Catholic Church also played a strong role in discouraging the UPC and affirming
the current political structure. While the administration attempted to combat the UPC by
appeasing malcontented workers, “the Catholic hierarchy ran a parallel campaign to
encourage their faithful to separate themselves completely from the UPC”44 . In addition to the
creation of an opposition party, the Bloc Démocratique du Cameroun (BDC), the Church
issued several pastoral letters condemning the UPC movement, as found below:
We place Christians on guard against the current tendencies of the political
party known under the name “Union of Cameroonian Peoples” (UPC) not
for the cause of independence which they defend, but the spirit which
animates it and that inspires their methods 45 .
38
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This “spirit” was communism, as the UPC was considered a Marxist-Leninist
movement, and thus, inherently against the Church and religion. Although independence
from the French Administration, and not necessarily the Catholic Church, was the target of
the UPC movement, its characterization as a socialist movement is nevertheless accurate. The
UPC was a member of the aforementioned RDA, which was affiliated with the French
Socialist Party. Although the RDA would eventually distance itself from the Socialist Party,
the UPC, nevertheless, remained a member organization. This association “reinforced the
mistrust of the administration against the UPC and drove it to a hostility declared against the
party” 46 .
1955, and the Naissance of the Maquis
Despite France’s claim that the creation of infrastructure was for the benefit of
Cameroonians and their development, the majority of investment in the nation was purely for
economic exploitation. Public investments by the French were criticized by radicals, and
private investments, for their European ownership, were criticized by elites and moderates 47 .
“The biggest part of their investments in infrastructure were not created to give Cameroon
viable economic unity, but to construct installations serving to export raw materials and
import industrial products” 48 . One such example of this investment was the Bridge of Wouri,
inaugurated in May 1955.
The bridge, in Douala, marked a major accomplishment in the development of
Cameroon’s “fertile crescent” region, which consisted of “two curving points being; one, the
region Yaounde to the east, and the other, the mountainous zone of the Bamileke country,
(ending) at Foumban.
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separated by the river Wouri” 49 . The motivation for the completion of the bridge can thus be
seen as primarily economic, but it also allowed for greater mobilization of the French
military, which was based in Douala.
Due to the rising popularity of the UPC nationalist movement, the French
Administration began to take more aggressive measures to combat the organization. On
February 19, 1955, administrators were given the right to use force to disperse UPC
reunions 50 . On May 20, 1955, the French Administration began monitoring all mail leaving
the country 51 . With the recent completion of the bridge at Wouri, the French quickly began
mobilizing against UPC regions in Douala and across the bridge to the Mungo region. In spite
of the forces’ superior resources, their efforts were nevertheless met with substantial
resistance:
During the afternoon of May 25, 1995 at Douala, two trucks of soldiers
disembarked to the market; they shoved men and women, yelling that
they were going to demolish the UPC’s national movement office. In
that year, the African population [...] grouped itself around the
headquarters of the UPC. The people did not want to see the colonialists
destroy the building constructed by their very hands for the nationalist
movement 52 .
Despite the UPC’s desire to maintain its identity as a non-violent political
organization, the mobilization of French forces made this increasingly difficult. Violent
manifestations began to break out all over Cameroon’s “fertile crescent” (See Appendix D).
Although there was no official connection between many of these events and the UPC, the
organization was blamed, nevertheless, by the administration and banned July 13, 1955 53 . As
a result, “the party found itself the more and more confronted not by the question of resisting
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or not resisting the provocation, but rather by the choice between inexistence or battling to
survive” 54 .
Although they had lost their political avenue, the UPC nevertheless intended to retain
its identity as a nationalist movement. Ruben Um Nyobe, the party’s secretary general,
expressed this sentiment shortly after the party’s banning:
In despite of the repression and of the corruption, the UPC affirms and
imposes itself as the sole dignified, national movement of this name in all
Kamerun. So it’s the French government, after the setback in their
tentative smothering of the Cameroonian problem before the United
Nations, resolved to liquidate the Cameroonian nationalism by force,
fomenting and driving the massacres of May 1955, and in banning,
arbitrarily, the three popular movements 55 .
And thus, the beginning of the Maquis movement was the immediate result of the
interdiction of the UPC party, and the necessity of taking the organization underground to
continue the fight. Violence became the sole means of continuing an ideological battle of
anti-colonial nationalism.
Later Maquis Movements
If independence was the goal of the UPC’s Maquis movement, why then did these
violent manifestations continue even after independence? Initially, “the formula was simple:
we had to chase away the whites 56 , so that the country returns to the population, to the
blacks” 57 . But after independence, the movement nevertheless continued. In the words of
Pierre Sekoufack, “we have our prefects, who were black like us [...] magistrates, tribunals –
we are free. We had independence in 1960, what are you still doing 58 ?”
For some who continued the movement, it was an issue of complete political and
economic emancipation from France. “Nationalists [...] fought for total independence of
54
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Cameroon. France wanted to continue colonization in a different form” 59 . This trend was not
isolated to Cameroon, in fact “when the territories became independent in 1960, all but one,
Guinea, chose to remain associated with their former colonialists, hoping to benefit from
French aid and technology while becoming an equal member in the community of nations” 60 .
Many of the Maquisards who continued to fight after independence saw this new regime as a
perpetuation of the old, and believed that only through severing all contacts with the former
colonizer could the country ever succeed.
In addition to more subtle political motivations, there were personal motivations as
well, particularly prominent in the Bamileke Maquis between 1958, and as late as 1970.
Much of my research of this period revealed that the motivations for Maquis members were
of a distinctly different character from the early nationalist movement, and often included
personal ambition or petty revenge. Informants who had lived during that period did not even
associate the UPC with the Maquis movement. According to René Tazo, who worked in the
forestry service during the period, “when we talk about the UPC, it’s a revolutionary party.
When we talk about the Maquis [...] they weren’t political – you could call them
murderers” 61 . As a result, this movement, though technically associated with the Maquis of
the UPC, is better characterized as a later, terrorist movement, and will not be further
investigated in this paper.

Cameroon Today
Despite nearly fifty years of independence, Cameroon still has many of the same
problems it faced before. “Independence was a precondition of economic prosperity, because
it removed the imperialists from direct authority over the third world. By itself, however, it
could not lead to significant economic improvement, since it changed none of the conditions
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that created the poverty” 62 . As a result, Cameroonians continue to face impediments to
genuine democracy, economic hardship, and the violation of their personal liberties.
Democracy in Cameroon
Democracy in Cameroon is of a dualistic nature. In principle, there is universal
suffrage for persons of twenty years of age and above, multiple political parties are allowed
to exist, and there is a constitution that embodies the ideals of human liberty and democracy.
Although democratic procedures and conditions are well defined, “it’s in the practice that one
finds fault” 63 .
The Cameroonian Constitution states: “The vote shall be equal and secret, and every
citizen aged twenty years and above shall be entitled to vote” 64 . By this statute, during the
2004 presidential election, approximately half of Cameroon’s population of 18,060,382 (CIA
WFB) was of voting age and eligibility 65 . Despite this fact, there were only 3,830,272 votes
cast. This abstinence can be attributed to many factors, some of which include the boycotting
of the election by several parties, and religions in Cameroon whose principle beliefs prevent
them from voting 66 .
What perhaps is even more dramatic is the voting participation among Cameroonian
youths. According to Thomas Fomekong, who was in charge of a voting office during the
2007 legislative elections, “nobody voted who wasn’t at least 25 years old [...] the youth does
not interest itself in politics, or even in elections” 67 . Although there are numerous causes in
Cameroon that contribute to low voting attendance, the overwhelming reality is that many
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people don’t believe that the institutions are truly democratic. Even though “Cameroonians
are interested in politics, they just don’t think it will change things” 68 .
Some attribute this pessimism to a kind of fatalism. “People aren’t interested in
elections because they think that the results are known in advance [...] the administration does
what it needs to do, so that the party in power wins” 69 . The 2007 legislative elections for the
general assembly would seem to support this conclusion. Despite the many opposition parties
in Cameroon, only 23 seats were awarded to the opposition, while the RDPC (Assembly of
the Democratic Peoples of Cameroon), the majority party, was awarded 140. In addition to
these statistics, 17 seats were left vacant due to “electoral fraud” 70

71

. Although, in principle,

this would seem to correct electoral flaws, the contested claims are rarely in regions that
support the majority party, and generally occur in hotbeds of the opposition 72 .
In addition to fatalism on the part of Cameroonians, there are blatant acts of fraud as
well. According to an article in the Post (Buea), “even those who fight to have their names
printed in the electoral register end up not having their voters' cards, while cards with fake
names are given to kids as young as 12 years to vote for the CPDM” 73 . Ndam Njoya the
national chairman of the Cameroon Democratic Union, called the twin elections “a missed
opportunity to advance the country's democratization process contrary to popular
expectations. He said the elections were rather a threat on the democratization process” 74 .
The government is likewise apathetic about genuine elections. According to Randy Joe
Sa-ah’s article “Cameroon’s Reluctant Campaigner” 75 , Paul Biya, “who is rarely seen in
public [...] hardly ever meets his population,” while opposition candidates “have gone round
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the country campaigning solidly since the election date was announced” 76 . In addition to his
reluctance to campaign, Mr. Biya “did not even convene a congress of his ruling Cameroon
People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) to seek re-nomination” 77 . The President, like a
monarch, seems assured of his position for years to come.
Unfortunately, he may be right, as the multi-party system born in the 1990s has yet to
be fully realized. When political parties were formed in the early 1990s in Cameroon, “they
didn’t understand the meaning of a multi-party system” 78 . Cameroonian political parties are
more often composed of groups of people from the same region, rather than members of
similar ideologies from diverse backgrounds 79 .
In addition to the problems inherent within purely regional parties, the sheer number
of opposition parties has likewise been an impediment. There are more than 100 opposition
parties in Cameroon 80 , and yet they were only able to win 23 of the 180 legislative seats 81 .
Taunting this reality, Mr. Biya once said, “who are these magicians who want to make
Cameroon a paradise with a magic wand? Let them get themselves united before dreaming of
changing Cameroon" 82 .

Elections are the process by which democracy renews itself. As long as elections in
Cameroon remain poorly attended and regulated, the vigor of Cameroon’s democratic
institutions will continue to wane. Without the strength of these institutions, the idea of
democracy and collective solutions to problems in Cameroon will become as frail and
enfeebled as its aging leaders, mirroring a past of colonial political dominance that gave birth
to the Maquis.
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The President of the Republic shall be elected for a term of office of
seven years. He shall be eligible for re-election once 83 .
The Cameroonian constitution designates the Presidential term to 7 years, and limits
the candidate to be reelected only one time. This constitution was signed into action in 1996
by President Paul Biya himself. However, there are those now who wish to revise the
constitution, most notably in order to extend the president’s eligibility for reelection
indefinitely.
This idea is not a new one to Central Africa. “It’s a phenomenon that isn’t limited to
Cameroon. In all the countries of Central Africa: Gabon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and the
Democratic Republic of Congo have already modified their constitutions so that the president
can sit for reelection eternally” 84 . The constitution allows for its amendment in articles 62 and
63, but it also states very clearly “No procedure for the amendment of the Constitution
affecting the republican form, unity and territorial integrity of the State and the democratic
principles which govern the Republic shall be accepted” 85 .
The proposed change has met strong opposition, as Mr. Biya’s term, originally set to
end in 2011, could yet be extended to the end of his life. The President has already served for
25 years.

Dr. Tazoacha Asonganyi, in an editorial in Buea’s Post, expressed adamant

opposition to the idea, claiming “since members of a political party do not want any other
person to take over the presidency of the country, they are inviting the incumbent to stay on
for perpetuity, forgetting the weaknesses inherent in human nature and the arm they can
wrought on society tomorrow, after their man had gone 86 !”
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The rationale for this proposed change is varied, but many believe it is a ploy by the
dominant political party to perpetuate its power. Members of the CPDM (the Cameroonian
Peoples’ Democratic Movement) claim that a term limit for the president is inherently
undemocratic, and that the people have the right to choose their president 87 . Although in
principle, constitutional change is not inherently deleterious “our problem with the present
motions is the selfishness [...] on which they are based. Constitutions should never depend on
the whims and caprices of political parties” 88 Many government officials “have amassed a
fortune [...] from public funds. They fear the departure of Paul Biya” 89 . This fear stems from
historical precedent, as Mr. Biya’s tribe, the Beti have monopolized strategic government
positions 90 . In addition to the monopoly of power, some believe that the attempted coup d’état
in 1982 was a ploy to get rid of members of the previous regime. The Beti fear that, given the
chance, this could likewise happen to them 91 .
With the proposed amendment to the constitution, Cameroon faces the perpetuation of
a plutocracy posing as a democracy, continuing a cycle of disempowerment for the majority
of Cameroonians that has lasted since the colonial period. Without adequate democratic
structures granting Cameroonians access to their government, Cameroonians must look
elsewhere to address their concerns and make meaningful changes to their lives.
Living Conditions in Cameroon
Despite Cameroon’s endowment of natural resources, it is still among the poorest
countries in the world. Conditions during the 1980’s in Cameroon, caused by what has come
to be known as the “economic crisis,” resulted in widespread unemployment and poverty; the
effects of which can still be felt today.

87

Dipoko, Adolf Mongo. “Owana is Not Against Constitutional Amendment.” Eden. 5 Nov. 2007.
Ibid
89
Dounkeng-Zele, Champlain, PhD. Personal Interview. 24 Nov. 2007.
90
Kamajou, François, PhD. Personal Interviews. 19 Nov. 2007, 20 Nov. 2007.
91
ibid
88

The economic crisis was caused by many factors. After independence, Cameroon
maintained a primarily agro-export economy, focusing on cash rather than sustenance crops.
A sharp drop in world market prices for these export crops, caused by lower demand in
importing countries lead to a significant reduction of foreign earnings, and began the cycle of
debt accumulation that would later haunt the administration’s fiscal policies. In addition to the
drop in world prices, there was an increase in world supply of coffee and cocoa, as Malaysia
and Indonesia began production. Although these unfavorable conditions would have been
enough, alone, to drastically affect Cameroon’s export economy, a concurrent hike in the
price of oil, orchestrated by OPEC (Oil-Producing and Exporting Countries) led to increased
input prices for Cameroonians, and the rampant inflation it caused in heavily oil-dependent
developed countries were transferred to Cameroon. Also, a government policy of subsidizing
fertilizer for cultivators was dismantled, driving input prices even higher for producers 92 .
As a result of these significant foreign debts, Cameroon began a process of structural
adjustment, guided by IMF and World Bank policies, with the goal of eliminating government
inefficiency, increasing business opportunities, and ultimately reducing Cameroon’s foreign
debt.

These policies especially targeted the governmental bureaucracy, which was “the

central source of political patronage and social welfare through the provision of public posts
to loyal followers and deserving clients” 93 . The civil service system was too large for two
primary reasons, “firstly due to the over-development of public agencies and organizations
charged with too broad and blurred responsibilities; secondly, many agencies employ too
many workers vis-à-vis their needs” 94 . This structure was both inefficient and costly, as
“when (one is) recruited into the private sector, (his) salary is fixed, each month [...] if (he)
work(s) a lot or a little, the salary is the same,” eliminating government worker’s incentives to
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work more hours, or work more efficiently 95 . Even after considerable adjustments to the
structure of the government, “The public services could run with less than 1/3 of those who
are there 96 ,” and the World Bank and IMF still suggest the downsizing of government
positions.
In addition to the restructuring of government positions, government subsidies were
significantly reduced, with the idea of eliminating the government protection of private
industries that were, as a result of this protection, inefficient. Although many of these
adjustment policies are often a topic of controversy, their necessity was evident, as:
For a few years, the third world debts were actually greater than the net
worth of the lending banks. In other words, if the debtor countries had
refused to honor their debts, the banks would have collapsed as business
entities. The specter of the collapse of the world banking system was
frightening, threatening another world depression that might have been
worse than the one in the 1930s 97 .
Today, Cameroon’s national debt composes 24.4 percent of its GDP (Gross Domestic
Product). 98 Despite the fact that Cameroon’s economy has achieved a real growth rate of 3.9
percent per year, “if the standard of living of the majority of the people is stagnating or even
deteriorating, it hardly matters to them if their country’s average income is growing 99 . And
this standard hasn’t grown, in fact “the average Cameroonian is worse off in terms of social
services and purchasing power (today), than he was in 1960” 100 .
When living conditions become unbearable, a population has little to lose by open
rebellion. In the words of Gabriel Kwenthieu, an associate director with the United States
Peace Corps, “people are hungry, they’re jobless, and they don’t know what to do. So they
run in the streets and burn things down [...] A hungry man is an angry mind 101 .” If living
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conditions do not improve, or continue to deteriorate in Cameroon, as they have for the last
twenty years, the incentive of personal security will likewise deteriorate. Without strong
disincentives to remain peaceful, violent revolution becomes a stronger possibility.
Unemployment, Underemployment and the Informal Sector
According to the Cameroonian constitution, “every person shall have the right and the
obligation to work” 102 . Unfortunately, like many of the Constitution’s unfilled promises, the
unemployment rate in Cameroon is estimated at 30 percent, with 48 percent of the population
living below the poverty line 103 . This phenomenon of unemployment in Cameroon is not new,
“but it’s a matter of percentage” 104 . This condition is primarily caused by an underdeveloped
private sector, and “college graduates have been particularly touched by this phenomenon. In
this economic environment, a degree does not necessarily facilitate professional insertion
anymore, and thus the level of unemployment climbs with the level of education” 105 . Thus, it
is not a matter of a lacking workforce, but that there simply aren’t enough jobs for qualified
applicants.
In response to this economy, “nearly 90 percent of workers in Cameroon work in the
informal sector [...] (as) the informal sector is believed, more and more since the economic
crisis, as a remedy to the problem of unemployment” 106 . Unfortunately, this sector is
generally not very lucrative, and is characterized by poor working conditions and precarious
remunerations. Others have even resorted to banditry to cope with the economic
difficulties 107 .
However, according to Joseph Tedou, the Cameroonian director of statistics,
unemployment is not even Cameroon’s greatest economic problem, but rather
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underemployment 108 . Underemployed workers work fewer than 35 hours a week and
constituted 75.8 percent of the working population in 2005, 69.3 percent of whom made less
than the legal minimum annual salary of 23,400 CFA francs, which has been called
“miserably insufficient to live and attend to their needs” 109 . To compensate for insufficient
salaries, extortion of public funds is a common phenomenon in Cameroon, and is practiced by
both law enforcement agents and the government alike.
Some have blamed Cameroon’s lack of development on economic liberalism, and
“neocolonial” economic policies put in place by developed countries with the hope of
exploiting Cameroon’s rich natural resources 110 . According to Dr. Nodem, a sociologist with
the University of Dschang, “France has not ceased to be here,” and many of the government
officials instated by the French during decolonization are still in power 111 . While, the French
government is and has been politically distinct from Cameroon since independence, there are,
nevertheless some disturbing trends in Cameroon’s economic character. Cameroon’s primary
export commodities consist of crude oil and petroleum products, lumber, cocoa beans,
aluminum, coffee, and cotton, while its primary import commodities are machinery, electrical
equipment, transport equipment, fuel, and food.

Cameroon’s exports are predominantly

unprocessed, natural resources, while its imports are primarily produced by well developed
industries. French imports constitute 23.6 percent of Cameroonian imports, while exports to
France constitute 11.6 percent 112 . In response to these policies, some have even characterized
the Cameroonian government as “a marionette of the west” 113 .
While free trade policies have subjected Cameroon to external pressures, internal
policies have impeded Cameroon’s economic development. Cameroon’s combination of high
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taxes on the public sector and lack of infrastructure has created an undesirable atmosphere for
entrepreneurialism. According to Gabriel Kwenthieu, “you get out of school and you can’t get
a job. You create a business. And you’re trying to succeed – they will come and kill your
business by taxing, by high taxes” 114 . As for infrastructure, “fixed-line connections stand at
less than 1 per 100 persons; equipment is old and outdated, and connections with many parts
of the country are unreliable” 115 . In addition to problems with communication, power outages
and poor road conditions continue to impede further development.
And this agricultural sector is arguably Cameroon’s most important, as “it is all but
impossible to enjoy an urban economy with a high standard of living unless that economy is
based on high-productivity agriculture [...] Nothing has been more harmful to the poor
countries than the negligence of their agricultural sectors”116 . As a result of its infrastructure,
Cameroon’s “biggest difficulties are in the marketing, the commercialization [...] the roads are
terrible” 117 . Isolated farmers in rural areas sell their products at low prices, and these same
crops are sold in Douala and Yaoundé at very elevated prices. The demand is high for
agricultural products, and yet “the producers do not benefit sufficiently from the fruit of their
labor” 118 . Given Cameroon’s climatic diversity, Cameroon is capable of producing temperate
crops that cannot be produced anywhere else in Africa, leading some economists to call the
state of Cameroon’s economy “a scandal” 119 .

Despite an impressive endowment of natural resources, Cameroon remains
impoverished, and in many ways, worse off than it was before independence. Rampant
unemployment has once again produced the same class of “under-proletariats” that were
114
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integral to the Douala riots in 1955. This level of economic oppression in modern Cameroon
can be only rivaled by the social oppression many Cameroonians face by the armed forces.
Human Rights in Cameroon
The Cameroonian Constitution includes the United Nations human rights declaration,
and its penal code punishes both torture and unwarranted arrest 120 . While “human rights exist
in Cameroon, like in all countries, (as) there is that text that says so [...] it’s in the practice that
we have a problem” 121 . According to Dr. Timtchueng, professor of Private Law at the
University of Dschang, “there are historical contexts of repression that existed” 122 .
Before 1990, the Police and Gendarmerie were afforded a great deal of freedom in
their exercise of power. “People with arms could do whatever they wanted,” and “there are
people (today) who want that privilege to continue even now” 123 . In addition to the power
afforded to the Gendarmerie by force, they also have received financial leverage from the
government. When civil servants across Cameroon saw their salaries cut in the 1990s, the
salaries of the Gendarmerie were maintained.

As a result, there is a rift between the

Cameroonian people and the Cameroonian army.
However, this condition is not purely institutional; fear and ignorance play a role. Dr.
Timtchueng states, “the majority of the population is unfamiliar with the law.” In addition to
ignorance, “people are scared to stand up to people with arms” 124 . Some trace this fear to the
Maquis movement itself, continuing to fear the dress of soldiers as a reminder of the violent
past. But human rights are not often granted to an apathetic population, “you have to grab it
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[...] it is not given to you” 125 . Cameroonian’s themselves must be willing to stand for their
rights if they ever hope to really gain them.

Manifestations
The freedom of communication, of expression, of the press, of assembly, of
association, and of trade unionism, as well as the right to strike shall be
guaranteed under the conditions fixed by law 126 .
Manifestations of frustration with living standards in Cameroon, primarily in the form
of strikes and demonstrations, have been occurring with increasing frequency in the past 15
years. Unpaid government workers, disgruntled college students, and harassed moto-taxi
drivers are only a few of the many Cameroonians who seek attention for change through
demonstrations. However, while many of these demonstrations are, themselves, peaceful,
they are met with violent, even deadly response from law enforcement. As a result, these
manifestations have been increasingly fervent, leading some to warn of a civil war 127 .
University of Buea 2005
Two years ago, on April 28th, at the University of Buea, two boys, Embwam Aloysius
and Gilbert Folem, were shot by the Buea police for their association with a demonstration
that was being held that afternoon 128 . The students, who had gone into the road to protest,
were met with tear-gas, beatings, and live fire by police. Leaders of the demonstration were
even dragged away and forced to lie on the ground, flat-bellied, while school-age
Gendarmerie students marched on top of them. In addition, some students who fled the
incident were tracked down to their rooms, attacked, and had valuables looted from their
rooms 129 .
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In response to this event, the SDF, the largest opposition party in Cameroon, issued
this press statement:
Instead of taking all the necessary time to listen to the complaints, as it
would have been the case elsewhere in the civilized world, the government,
as usual, opted to provoke violence by using live bullets on the protesting
students. It is pitiable that this nascent institute for health has to be
inaugurated this way with blood and death 130 .
Bamenda – October 16, 2007
In October 2007, there were violent manifestations of frustration in Bamenda that were
likewise met with lethal violence by law enforcement authorities. After the severe beating of a
comrade, who had refused to pay the bribe demanded of him at one of Cameroon’s many
security checkpoints, two moto-taxi drivers went to the police station for his release, but were
chased away with tear gas. According to witnesses, the taxi driver had been “thoroughly
beaten until he lost consciousness and one of his eyes" 131 . In response, "They then invaded
the town, mounting roadblocks and blocking the traffic. When the security forces came out to
lift the roadblocks, (the protestors) threw stones at them 132 . Witnesses report that thousands
joined the protests, tired of extortion from armed officials. Unfortunately, these
demonstrations, too, were met with gunfire, leaving two moto-taxi drivers dead, and a
pregnant woman injured.
Strike at National Laboratory, October 2007
Also in October, 2007, laboratory technicians at the “National Civic Genius
Laboratory,” in Yaounde, went on strike after not having received salaries for 26 months. One
demonstrator asked, “nothing for 26 months [...] how will we feed our children 133 ?” The
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demonstrators goals are not complicated, “we want our money” said one of the technicians,
“our living conditions are very difficult” 134 .
In addition to the unpaid salaries, laboratory workers are forced to endure unsafe
working conditions, in which they lack sanitary protections to wear. Appolonie Amougou, an
employee of the lab since 1976, stated: “we are tired of false promises, even if we are paid,
we still want to know that our conditions are going to improve”135 .
Power Outages and Strikes in Kumba
After months of no electricity, residents of Kumba took to the streets in early
November 2007 with placards demanding the restoration of electricity. Although power
outages are common in many parts of Cameroon, the sheer duration of the power-outage
began unbearable for those affected.

Most of Cameroon’s electricity comes from

hydroelectric power plants that were created during the reign of Amadou Ahidjo, Cameroon’s
first President. The main source for Kumba is powered by the Sanaga river, with reserve
barrages at Bamenjin. Although fluctuations in power output vary with water flow “during
the rainy season, this becomes unexplainable! 136 ”
Kumba, which is a major Cocoa production center in Cameroon, was inundated with
protests which halted the passage of cocoa transporting vehicles for half a week 137 . However,
their frustration was not only in response to the outages; “the incidence coincided with
suffering people. You have to ask ‘What is their lifestyle? 138 ’” As has become usual, the
government troops shot live ammunition into the crowd to disperse it, and in the process
killed two students.

About 25 people were arrested as well 139 . Shortly after the

demonstration, cocoa exportation resumed, and the power was returned.
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No single incident can epitomize all the manifestations of frustration in Cameroon, but
through comparing these case studies, we are able to find a disturbing trend. To summarize in
the words of Bongsha Steve, “Every now and then, when a citizen or citizens want to defend
themselves or their rights, they either end up dead, wounded or being locked up by the police
who have the arms. 140 ” Although the goals and outcomes of these demonstrations are diverse,
their frequency and intensity suggests that there is a significant population of Cameroonians
that are unsatisfied with their lifestyles, and are willing to risk death and injury in an attempt
to change them.
If these demonstrations were dispersed peacefully, through cooperative solutions, they
might represent an alternative means of democratic change to the government. However,
their violent dispersal, and the refusal of authorities to consider their demands, suggests that
strikes and demonstrations are not an effective means of change in Cameroon either.
Frustrated with an unresponsive government, a stagnating economy, and lacking democratic
means of peaceful demonstration, it is quite possible for many Cameroonians that violent
revolution may be the only outlet for change.

Features of Cameroon Preventing Revolution
“More and more, I am skeptical of whether there will be a movement in
Cameroon” 141 .
Despite these conditions, however, many Cameroonians with whom I spoke were
skeptical if there ever would be such a revolution. Reasons for this include Cameroon’s
history, pessimism, the possibility of individual solutions, Cameroon’s context in Central
Africa, and recent improvements in democracy.
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According to Dr. Mathias Atsatito, a sociologist with the University of Dschang,
“People look for the easiest solution [...] (they) want power, but adopt a strategy of
facility” 142 . As violent revolutions are only born when peaceful ones are impossible,
“collective movements are born only when individual strategies are not effective 143 ”.
However, he believes that Cameroonians have found ways around their struggles, stating: “we
have found other strategies to cope with bad economics to assure life [...] people find a way
[...] individual strategies are still possible 144 ”.
One such strategy is to escape. According to Mr. Fomekong, “the grand majority of
people dream of nothing more than to leave the country [...] It’s a form of resignation” 145 .
This resignation represents pessimism on the part of Cameroonians who would like to see
change, but believe that it is effectively impossible. Their solution for them is simply to
leave.
In addition, Cameroon remains a relatively stable nation in a region of Africa
infamous for its political coups and armed rebellions. Surrounded by Chad, Nigeria, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and others, Cameroon has
managed to maintain a level of peace, since its independence, which few other countries in the
region have. Some attribute this peace to “the spirit of ‘the people’ of Cameroon and their
outlook on life” 146 . Others, to Cameroon’s diversity, as there are over 200 ethnic groups in
Cameroon alone. If revolution were to ever arrive, it would be difficult to discern who was
fighting against whom.
However, history undoubtedly plays a role as well. “In Cameroon today, there is a
cleavage between those who lived the events and those who did not: between those who have
direct experience of the period of anti-colonial battles, and the others, who don’t have any
142
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memory but the post-colonial regime” 147 . Many of the Cameroonians, still living, who
experienced the violence of the Maquis, were traumatized by the events, as “it wasn’t only
violence in the sense of combat; it was violence in the sense of premeditated murder ... of
torture! 148 ” Although this generation may be one of the greatest stabilizing forces in
Cameroon today, it is important to note that “the young people don’t have the same
mentality” 149 .
Alternatives to Revolution
In addition to the factors that would prevent future violent revolutions, there are many
alternatives that could address these problems. James Beighle, an associate director with the
United States Peace Corps, believes “we could have a revolution in Cameroon, but all the
hopes are that it is a peaceful revolution” 150 . Due partly to the relative peace Cameroon has
enjoyed, “that’s where Cameroon wants to see (change) come from, and people are being
extremely patient so it does come from there” 151 . Some have even suggested that this
revolution could be of a divine nature: “If there’s more of a push from the Church [...] they’re
great at doing campaigns for all kinds of things [...] What happened in Ghana could happen
here” 152 . Beighle, who was wary to suggest radical evangelism as an answer, nevertheless
admitted its possibility.
Education may yet hold the solution to Cameroon’s problems, as “educational
philosophies that were adopted from colonists are in some cases the last vestige of
colonialism” 153 . This system, not necessarily tailored to the specific needs of Cameroons, has
continued to exist in Cameroon, and emphasizes a “classic” education above a more practical
one. As Isbister explains:
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The conviction frequently remains, however, that the best education is a
general one, an education that deals with great ideas and significant literature,
not one that immerses students in technical detail. As a consequence, higher
educational systems in the third world often turn out a surplus of teachers and
lawyers but leave their countries with a significant shortage of technically
trained people: engineers, scientists, and economists 154 .

Education in Cameroon more tightly integrated with the economic sector could
arguably help place university graduates in the private sector jobs that exist, and help attract
new industries. Focusing on building human capital, rather than perpetuating a defunct
colonial system, includes “education in all its dimensions – from basic literacy through
technical training and on-the-job skill enhancement to higher education” 155 .
In the same manner, the focus of classic education on memorization and recitation
does not lend itself to addressing the problems Cameroonians face daily. Although an abstract
concept to implement, an education focused on critical thinking, rather than rote
memorization, would be arguably more helpful. “People [...] go to school, they memorize
things, they don’t learn how to do things on their own, they don’t think about what they’re
doing” 156 .

This system could emphasis finding solutions to problems and battle the

predominant pessimism epitomized in the phrase “On va faire comment? 157 ” This would
entail training Cameroonians with “an inquiring approach methodology,” in which, “they are
to think about what they are doing. They take the reality in the community and bring that into
the classroom” 158 .
Education could likewise be used to reconcile the historical wounds that still affect
Cameroonians today, as “one can learn a great deal about the conflicts of a society by looking
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at the manner in which it represents itself and its history” 159 . Educators have only recently
been able to even discuss the period of independence, other than to condemn the Maquis
activities as terrorism. Some believe that this dialogue is paramount in keeping something like
the Maquis from occurring again. “Everything [...] that can rehabilitate the memory of these
people (the Maquisards) will be able to contribute to avoid a violent situation [...] it’s our past
– out present identity has been built by the past [...] we cannot forget that legacy [...] it’s
everyone’s responsibility” 160 .
The government also has a significant role to play if peaceful change in Cameroon is
to be maintained. One important task is the continued dismantling of defunct government
structures that sap the economy of tax revenue and accomplish little. As a result of high taxes
on the private sector, several large enterprises, originally local to Cameroon, have delocalized
to Equatorial Guinea and Singapore in search of more favorable conditions 161 . The
dismantling of these structures would allow for a reduction of taxes, seen as necessary by
many economists to create business incentives. “If taxes are too high, people are not going to
create enterprises [...] man does not work to pay taxes” 162 .
In the same vein, greater democracy would enable Cameroonians access to institutions
of peaceful change. “Today, there is a deficit of political communication [...] of political
participation. You need that advantage of social dialogue; a negotiation of the political plan
[...] that will permit (democracy) and avoid a violent situation” 163 . This democracy, however,
will not be given to Cameroonians for nothing. If Cameroon is ever to realize a true
democracy, Cameroonians must be willing to participate. Unfortunately, many “think that
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democracy has not changed their living conditions. There is now more poverty than there was
when there was only one party” 164 .
Fairer elections are one place to start, as “without free and fair elections, we cannot
have the ‘freely expressed will of the people’” 165 . The government and the Cameroonian
people can both improve this situation, through greater transparency and greater participation,
respectively. The peace of Cameroon should not have to come from personal resignation, but
from “the guarantee of trust, solidarity, and patriotism” as “a democratic society is only
possible within a framework that is open to challenge and change 166 ”. It is not an easy change,
but it very well may be a necessary one.

CONCLUSION
Before even beginning my research, I knew that I would come to one of three basic
conclusions. The first conclusion was that the causal conditions of the Maquis revolution are
not similar enough to draw a correlation to the present. The second possibility was that the
causal conditions are indeed similar between the two periods, but there are other factors in the
present that will most likely prevent a violent revolution from occurring. The final possibility
was that the causal conditions are similar, and lead me to believe that a violent revolution in
Cameroon’s future is imminent.
Although I do not believe that the causal conditions of the Maquis revolution still exist
today, I do believe that there exist conditions today that could, nevertheless, lead to a
rebellion. The actions of the UPC and the Maquisards themselves were a response to colonial
oppression by a white, European administration, and were part of a greater continental
struggle for decolonization. While there were significant social and economic pressures for
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Cameroonians during that period, the most forceful goals of the movement were political and
philosophical.
By contrast, the state of Cameroon today is not one of foreign colonization; it is one of
Cameroonians governing themselves.

The level of poverty, unemployment, and general

frustration among Cameroonians is clearly evident, and yet, there are often insufficient means
to voice this frustration. Demonstrations are met with violence, sometimes lethal, and the
democratic institutions created to protect the rights of citizens are often the greatest culprits of
their violation. If there were a revolution in the near future, it would not be born out of
nationalist principles 167 , but out of socio-economic frustration.
And yet, Cameroon has made, and continues to make, progress. Although they have
little power, there are more than 100 political parties. The press, although not completely
free, has resources to question and criticize the administration. Likewise, educators now have
more freedom to discuss the nationalist movement that gave birth to present day Cameroon,
while in the past, even the mention of the name of Ruben Um Nyobe was illegal168 . If trends
toward greater democratization and personal freedoms continue, Cameroon may well continue
to be l’arbre de paix 169 in the hotbed of Central Africa.
Had I more time and freedom to complete this project, I would have traveled
(additionally) to Mungo, Sanaga Maritime, and Douala in search of documentation and living
members of the Maquis. Although I still believe that the resources available to me in
Dschang made it the best location, I acknowledge that additional and more diverse regional
information would have given my project more depth.
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Final Thoughts
In closing, I’d like to step back from the academic focus of the paper. I was eating
dinner one night during the project and discussing my research with one of two Cameroonian
friends. When I had finished describing my research, the other Cameroonian eating with us
was noticeably affected, and preceded to tell me the story of how his father was killed by the
Maquisards before his very eyes when he was yet a boy. “I get so mad when I talk about the
Maquisards,” he said, “I could kill somebody” 170 .
I hope that in my research and predictions, I never lose sight of the fact that history is
more than a story, but the real lives of human beings. Although my research has found
significant parallels between the present and the past, there is no guarantee that even with
identical conditions, all people, or all Cameroonians for that matter, will behave in the same
way. As a historian, I recognize my limits in predicting the future. My predictions are
ultimately intellectual, and will only be tested with time. That being said, I hope that there
will not be a violent revolution in Cameroon, ever, as violent revolutions have been the cause
of some of the greatest suffering in human history. For the friends I’ve made during my stay,
and as a human being, I hope that any revolution that occurs in Cameroon’s future is both
peaceful and beneficial for the people of Cameroon.
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APPENDIX A
Cameroonian Election Results
(from: African Elections Database)
11 October 2004 Presidential Election
Registered Voters
4,657,748
Total Votes (Voter
3,830,272 (82.2%)
Turnout)
Invalid/Blank Votes
72,051
Total Valid Votes
3,758,221
Party
Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (RDPC)

Number of Seats (180)
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Social Democratic Front (SDF)
Cameroon Democratic Union (UDC)

14
04

National Union for Democracy and Progress (UNDP)
04
Progressive Movement (MP)
01
Vacant*
17
*The Supreme Court nullified the results in five districts (affecting a total of 17 seats) on
account of various irregularities. By-elections will be held at a later date to fill the vacant
seats.
APPENDIX B
Civil Service Positions in Colonial Government
(from: Joseph, Richard Le mouvement nationaliste… p168)
Tableau XIII

Européens
Africains

1947
14.1 %
85.9 %

1954
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APPENDIX C
The Bridge at Wouri
(from : Joseph, Richard Le mouvement nationaliste… Picture #36)
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